The Powell Report

The Powell Report

E J Powell 20 January 2014

Report by E.J.Powell. BSc (Hons), MRSH, MCABE 20 January 2014.

Client: M I McNicholas and associated companies, 36 Lanehead Road, Etruria, Stoke on Trent. ST1 5PT

Site to be surveyed: land occupied by Capital Gas Centre Ltd., used by this company to store and retail pre-packed LPG (cylinders) and bulk LPG as Autogas. The address of these premises is Salem Street, Etruria, Stoke on Trent.

I have been asked to survey the above named property, as a new development, on a green field basis and how it is being operated today. Although the site has been used as an LPG storage site and it is currently used for that purpose for the past 6 years or so, consideration is given to relevant regulations during the entire period. As such very little has changed regarding regulations and Codes of Practice, therefore I am using documents supplied to me by the client and further information derived from other sources.

Given that Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is an extremely volatile gas there is a wealth of information on safety available from several different sources. The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Act 2002, and encompassing codes of practice derived from the UKLPG association, HSE guides etc., contain safety information that is absolute and uncompromising in the level of safety and is statutorily enforceable. While the documents stated do not preclude the use of different designs and approaches, they do not compromise on the level of safety, it is absolute.

The Site

For identification purposes, that the site is south to north orientated looking into the site from the vehicular access from the south.

Description

There is an LPG cylinder store in the northwest corner of the site and immediately adjacent there are 3 x 1tonne LPG tanks elevated to approximately 1 metre.

The site has brick walls on the east and west elevations, the front of the site is open palisade fencing and the rear a cast concrete wall on which sits the boundary fence.

The west wall comprises a simple brick construction and is in the ownership and control of the client company, which trades in a similar fashion as Capital Gas Centre Ltd., selling LPG in cylinders and bulk LPG as Autogas. This wall forms one side of the main building of the client’s property it extends to 5.7metres tall with two altered sections to the external veneer and reduces the wall to 105mm depth at these points. The dividing wall between the 2 properties falls well short of the requirements of a fire wall; LPG cylinders should not be stored within 3 metres of this wall. The wall continues past the cylinder store for the full length of the site.

The east elevation is a continuous wall that has openings in the form of a window and door to the Capital Gas Centre Ltd., office, through which there is pedestrian access into the adjoining site believed to be operated by an associated company Capital Roofing Centre Ltd.

Capital Gas Centre Ltd., controls the majority of this boundary. The remainder is office accommodation controlled by a third party, forming the south east corner of the boundary wall which has windows of standard single window pane glass. Between the two offices the boundary wall has a honeycomb section of brickwork which could allow air movement in any direction into capital roofing where bituminous materials could be stored.

The rear elevation is approximately 2metres tall of concrete and engineering brick construction on which sits a security fence, and the ground rises to 3metres with a heavy covering of shrubbery. In this raised section of fence is a gate which allows pedestrian access to canal users, and through access for dog walkers and others. The thoroughfare from this pedestrian gate gives access to the sales office. See 2.6.1 fencing and gates.

CODE OF PRACTICE 1

Bulk Storage of LPG at Fixed Installations

This code deals with above ground installations where LPG is stored under pressure at ambient temperatures in fixed vessels larger than 75kg capacity.. It applies to all installations whether or not the material is stored for use on site or transhipment and subsequent use off site etc.

Section 2 – Plant Location and Safety Distances

2.2. Accessibility and layout of vessels

The layout and grouping of vessels (as distinct from spacing) should receive careful consideration so as to ensure:

The avoidance of spillage from one vessel affecting any other vessel or adjacent facility.

2.3.1.1. Storage vessels should be spaced and located in accordance with Table 1 which is 3.5metres. This is also stated in COP 7.

As mentioned above the portable and fixed storage are adjacent.

The bulk storage consists of 3 x 1tonne bulk tanks.

There are the larger cylinders ranging from 47kg to 6kg in the adjacent compound within the required 7.5 metres.

2.5 Storage Areas

2.5.1.1. The ground beneath or immediately adjacent to vessel connections should be concreted or compacted and arranged to prevent either the accumulation of any liquid beneath them or its flow affecting other vessels or important areas. Provision should be made for handling the run off cooling water applied under fire conditions.

There is a bunded mound adjacent to and supporting the bulk LPG vessels that has a rounded covering whose shape has negated any evidence of correct compaction. This suggests that further investigation is required to ensure that beneath the mound the proper compaction has taken place. Voids could be present into which spilled gas could collect.

Should it be proven that the compaction is inadequate the entire area is classified as Zone 1. See implications under section, The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2002 (DSEAR).

There is no provision for handling the run off of cooling water applied under fire conditions. At present the run off would travel the length of the site onto the highway and pond under a road bridge.

2.5.1.2. To prevent the formation of gas pockets, the vicinity of LPG vessels should be free from pits and depressions within the separation distance given in Table 1.

A newly constructed wall has been built between the mound and the cylinder storage area. This construction has left a depression between the bulk tanks and the wall, into which LPG could collect. A step has also been constructed in this line of wall which would allow collected LPG to pour into the cylinder storage area.

To the extreme north west of the site, there is an exposed cavity to the adjacent property that will allow penetration and accumulation of LPG from the Capital Gas site. Any resultant explosion and or fire, would have a chimney affect through the cavity and penetrate the adjacent building and gas storage area. This situation is hazard plus hazard.

Provision for Spillage of LPG

2.5.2.2. Diversion kerbs with a height not exceeding 500mm to avoid forming gas traps may be required to direct possible spillage away from vessels and sources of ignition to a safe area for evaporation or containment.

There are two routes for a possible spillage one as per the cooling water mentioned above, and now into the cylinder storage area and eventually through the site, onto the highway and pond under a highway bridge, where a passing source of ignition is highly likely.

I consider the site too small to provide a safe containment area; transport of leaked gas to any part of the site would be towards the public highway and would only exacerbate the leakage problem.

2.6 Storage Compound Protection

2.6.1. Fencing and Gates

The area which includes above ground vessel and pumping equipment should be enclosed by an industrial type fencing e.g. open mesh or palisade types which: is at a distance of not less than 1.5metres from the storage installation (unless it is adequately protected for example if the area comes within a greater fenced area or is otherwise separated from the public).

The public has access from the canal for retail services, as well as dog walking, and only deterred from accessing the bulk storage by an 800mm tall demountable timber fence and this is non-compliant with the regulations.

Around the immediate vessel area fences should have two means of escape…

There is one gated access and the only other means is over the bunded wall then the timber fence. This is non compliant especially in a situation of panic or high nerves such as a serious gas leak.

2.6.2. Installations with Uncontrolled Access.

Storage installations for supply to autogas refuelling site to which the public have uncontrolled access (without controlled access and a secure perimeter fence), should have a perimeter as in 2.6.1 above.

The fence should be at least 3metres from the vessel.

The distance between the fence and the vessel may be reduced to 1.5metres at auto gas refuelling sites, provided that the compound is subject to constant surveillance (i.e. where the site has attended operation 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and the vessel is visible to the site staff either directly or by close circuit television).

This site is not open continuously day and night, nor do we know it is serviced by other security methods, so the 1.5 metre ruling cannot be applied.

Having tested the visibility during the day by making test purchases, there is an extremely long wait, on occasions, before being noticed and served. Persons using the pedestrian access may not be noticed for some considerable time, if at all. This would indicate that there is infrequent surveillance and that the inadequate timber fence would not prevent access to the bulk tanks and LPG storage area.

2.6.3. This does not apply because the public have uncontrolled access.

4.8 Grass and Weed Control

Also see COP 7 for portable vessels. Weeds, long grass, deciduous shrubs and trees and any combustible material should be removed from an area within the separation distance in column (a) of Table 1 (for vessels not exceeding 1.1 tonnes water capacity), and within 6 metres for larger vessels.

The following is for explanation purposes to highlight the inherent dangers of LPG.

Appendix A: Safe Handling and Properties of LPG

(d) Escape of even small quantities of the liquefied gas can give rise to large volumes of vapour/air mixture and thus cause considerable hazard. A suitably calibrated explosimeter may be used for testing the concentration in the air.

(e) At very high concentrations in air, LPG is anaesthetic, and subsequently an asphyxiant by diluting or decreasing the available oxygen.

Appendix B: Area Classification

B.1

Zone 0 - A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air or dangerous substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is present continuously or for long periods or frequently.

Zone 1 - A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air or dangerous substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.

Zone 2 - A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air or dangerous substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only.

One of the main criteria in the Zone 2 is ventilation; this site has severely restricted ventilation which changes any classification of Zone 2 to Zone 1.

This will be discussed under Dangerous Substances and Explosive Regulations 2002 (DSEAR).

CODE OF PRACTICE 7

Storage of Full and Empty LPG Cylinders and Cartridges.

2.3.3. Prevention of tampering and vandalism. (see also COP1)

Measures to prevent tempering and vandalism should be taken… fencing should not obstruct ventilation and be of a robust industrial type.

2.2.10. Clearance of Rubbish and Foliage. (see also COP1)

There should be no build up of rubbish, dry leaves, small bushes or other materials which might easily catch fire within the separation distances given in Table 1.

Long grass and weeds should be removed from within the separation distances and up to 3metres from cylinders.

This was only complied with when informed of an imminent inspection, and the bunded mound was weeded.

The rear retaining wall is approximately 1800mm tall then rises up an embankment outside the control of the site operator.

The embankment is, in part, inside the 3metre separation distance and is heavy with trees, weeds and grasses, but again, outside the control of Capital Gas Centre Ltd.

The bottle store has a 675mm wall measured to the east elevation which then rises up a small embankment that is displaying the onset of weeds and grasses despite being weeded before being informed of an inspection.

To the rear of the bottle store there is a gap between the client’s boundary wall/building and the rear retaining wall. This gap is approx 1metre wide.

This gap is outside the control of Capital Gas Centre Ltd., but the adjacent business is also retailing in LPG. In the event of an incident we have a double jeopardy situation.

2.4.1. General

2.4.1.1. The site storing LPG containers (400kg or more) should be well ventilated to allow dispersal of gas from any small leaks. Tall buildings and high walls may adversely affect natural ventilation. In general not more than 50% of the perimeter of the storage area should be obstructed. The obstructions should not be on adjacent sides. (See ACOP1)

The east and west boundaries are tall buildings the lowest of which is 5.8 metres, the rear boundary with the embankment rises to 3metres.

The bottle store is sited to the north west corner and is bounded by the 5.8metre wall of the adjacent building, the 1.9metre rear wall plus embankment of 750mm totalling 2.65metres. and a small bund wall.

We again have a double jeopardy situation, where we have a walled in storage area contained within a larger walled in area, both in excess of 80% instead of the 50% required under 2.4.1.1 above.

It follows, therefore that there is gross under ventilation of the site for the storage of LPG.

As a measure of the importance of ventilation Fire walls have to fall under the requirements. See below:

Stores containing more than 400kg should have no more than 2 fire walls and the remaining 2 sides should be so constructed that natural ventilation is not impaired.

A criterion for Zone 2 rating is ventilation and because of the restricted ventilation, must be downgraded to Zone 1. See description under zoning.

There is not a wall on site that can be classed as a fire wall.

2.4.1.2. The storage area should be sited in accordance with Table 1.

The minimum distance between an LPG cylinder store and any of the following should be calculated on the basis of…total LPG stored… size of stack.

Table 1 gives a minimum distance of 3metres to boundaries.

The bottle store boundary is formed, in part, by next door’s building, and the rear wall that is a boundary to the canal. If responsibility for the wall does not appear in Capital Gas deeds then it belongs to the party whose land is being supported i.e. British Waterways.

There is evidence of bottles being stored against, or less than the three metre restriction, to both walls without the permission of the adjacent owners.

Storage of 400kg or less only can be stored against the neighbour’s wall without their consent.

2.4.1.3. Not more than 50kg of LPG in cylinders, with pressure relief valves that vent horizontally, should be stored or kept within 3metres of any of the following.

(a) A vessel containing flammable liquid.

(e) A bulk LPG vessel of 5000 litres capacity or less.

The bottle store and bulk LPG storage are immediately adjacent in complete contravention of the above recommendation.

2.4.1.6. Where a dangerous liquid or dense vapour such as liquid oxygen or LPG or corrosive liquids could flow towards cylinders in the event of a leak, the ground should be graded, or diversion or bund walls provided.

If there is a gradient within the bottle store it is barely discernible, and not sufficient to divert any leakage from a surge of vapour from a ruptured, elevated tank or vessel immediately adjacent to the bottle store. If the leak is of any significance, either initially or progressively becomes so, the surge will carry to the rear of the site and conceivably entrain through the previously mentioned gap into the adjacent site.

An additional problem is that the surge of LPG would carry over the site into the road and accumulate under a road bridge that carries a large amount of traffic.

DSEAR Regulations

The following abstracts are from the DSEAR 1972, revised 2003, and cover the areas where the site deviates from the requirement with no supplementary alternative installed. There is also general guidance that it is considered was not taken into account on the initial site assessment. Few direct comments have been inserted in the following to save excessive repetition of observations made under other legislation.

Introduction

The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations 2001 (DSEAR) are concerned with protection against risks from fire, explosion and similar events arising from dangerous substances used or present in the workplace. They set minimum requirements for the protection of workers from fire and explosion risks related to dangerous substances and potentially explosive atmospheres. The Regulations apply to employers and the self-employed at most workplaces in Great Britain where a dangerous substance is present or could be present.

Regulation 2 Interpretation

Risk

75. Risk is the chance, high or low, that someone will be harmed by the hazard. For the purposes of these Regulations the definition of ‘risk’ builds on the definition of hazard and ensures that the risks addressed are those created by the physical and chemical properties of substances and preparations which can lead to fires, explosions and similar energetic events; and, in turn, lead to the harmful physical effects mentioned above, and the extent of the harm.

The likely presence of explosive atmospheres and the need for hazardous area classification.

133. Gases, vapours, mists and dusts can give rise to explosive atmospheres. Hazardous area classification, as required by Regulation 7, is intended to identify places where, because of the potential for an explosive atmosphere, controls over sources of ignition are required. The results of the classification are then used to control the equipment that may be used, or the work activities that may be carried out, in these areas so as to prevent ignition.

Size of release

143. Some potential sources of release may be so small that there is no need to specify a zoned area. This will be the case if the consequence of an ignition following a release is unlikely to cause danger to people in the vicinity. However, in the wrong circumstances ignition of quite small quantities of flammable gas/vapour mixed with air can cause danger to anyone in the immediate vicinity. Where this is the case, as in a relatively confined location from which rapid escape would be difficult, area classification may be needed even where quite small quantities of a dangerous substance are present.

144. The size of any potential release of dangerous substances is in part related to the amount of dangerous substances present.

Ventilation

146. Ventilation, either natural, or mechanically induced (e.g. by a fan), can both dilute sources of release, and remove dangerous substances from an enclosed area. Consequently there is a close link between the ventilation at any given location, and the classification and extent of a zone around a potential source of release. Well designed ventilation may prevent the need for any zoned area around a source of release, or reduce it so it has a negligible extent.

Extent of Zones

147. The assessment needs to identify areas within the workplace that are connected to places where an explosive atmosphere may occur.

Capital Gas office connects through to Capital Roofing.

149. Some repeated activities such as refuelling cars, or loading and unloading tankers intended for use on the public roads, involve the introduction of potential sources of ignition into an area where a spill is possible, and which would meet the description of a hazardous area.

154. All potential sources of ignition in these areas should be taken into account. The biggest risk is mechanically produced sparks from car engines, see comments under zoning.

…the scale of the anticipated physical effects and the extent of harm arising from the fire, explosion or similar event….

156. The scale of effects and the extent of harm will depend on the amount of heat radiated and the size of any forces created either directly or indirectly from an incident. These in turn will depend on the amounts of material involved, how quickly they can be consumed, how the incident could escalate and whether conditions exist or could develop to cause a fire, explosion, or similar event.

157. Where an explosion is likely the scale of the effects will depend on the material; the size of the potential explosive atmosphere; the strength and shape of the containment; and whether the internal configuration or any obstructions will accelerate the burning rates. Consideration of these factors will allow an assessment of who will be affected by an accident, and to what extent, and what mitigation measures will be required.

This includes places which are or can be connected via openings to places in which explosive atmospheres may occur.

158. The assessment needs to identify areas within the workplace that are connected to places where an explosive atmosphere may occur. This will provide information on any areas away from the source of the hazard to which an explosive atmosphere may spread, for example through ducts. Such areas should be included in the classification system for places where explosive atmospheres may occur as set out in Regulation 7 and Schedule 2.

159. Openings between rooms within a building also provide a route for the spread of any release of flammable material that is released in an incident, and also a route for the effects of flames, burning particles or pressure waves to spread to other parts of a building or plant. These possibilities should be considered in any risk assessment so that the appropriate preventive, control and other measures required by the Regulations can be determined.

See comments under 147 above on site office.

Assessing the Overall Risk

162. When carrying out a suitable and sufficient risk assessment it is important that employers also assess the overall risk presented by dangerous substances as well as assessing each factor separately.

Identifying Who Might be Harmed and to What Extent

170. It is important to remember that substances with flammable or explosive properties have the potential to harm people off-site as well as those at the workplace itself.

This must include workers at the office on the south east corner.

The domestic premises that have cladding fixed to the outside, this will not remain in position in the event of an explosion and will contribute to the fire load that will penetrate buildings through capsized windows.

277. Where fire walls and fire-resisting structures provide containment for leaks of dangerous substance and/or prevent any escaping vapours from reaching an ignition source while still flammable, such barriers should not be perforated by any openings. They should be constructed to withstand contact with the dangerous substance in the form and quantity that might foreseeably occur in the event of an accident.

Regulation 6 Elimination or Reduction of Risks from Dangerous Substances

(d) The prevention of the formation of an explosive atmosphere, including the application of appropriate ventilation.

Lack of ventilation previously mentioned.

(e) Ensuring that any release of a dangerous substance which may give rise to risk is suitably collected, safely contained, removed to a safe place, or otherwise rendered safe, as appropriate.

There is no facility on site to nullify the above problem no walls can be classified as a fire wall.

(2) Schedule 2 Classification of places where explosive atmospheres may occur Regulation 7(1) (which substantially reproduces the provisions of Annex I of Council Directive 99/92/EC(a))1 Places where explosive atmospheres may occur.

(3) A place in which an explosive atmosphere may occur in such quantities as to require special precautions to protect the health and safety of the workers concerned is deemed to be hazardous within the meaning of these Regulations. A place in which an explosive atmosphere is not expected to occur in such quantities as to require special precautions is deemed to be non-hazardous within the meaning of these Regulations.

Classification of hazardous places. Hazardous places are classified in terms of zones on the basis of the frequency and duration of the occurrence of an explosive atmosphere.

(4) Zone 0. A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of dangerous substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is present continuously or for long periods or frequently.

(5) Zone 1. A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of dangerous substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.

(6)Zone 2. A place in which an explosive atmosphere consisting of a mixture with air of dangerous substances in the form of gas, vapour or mist is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short period only

The poor ventilation on site downgrades the area to at least grade 1 in which any mechanically produced spark (motor cars) should be excluded.

The site as a whole has severely restricted ventilation and made worse by the siting of the bottle store being bounded by three walls within the main boundary, this makes the site untenable for the purposes of retailing LPG in cylinders or in bulk as for autogas, based on poor ventilation alone.

HSG GUIDANCE 138

The duties of the DSEAR apply alongside the HSW Act and other regulations made under the Act, and also regulations on fire precautions.

There is significant interface with previously cited key legislation.

The more pertinent observations have been included even where repetitive but I have refrained from repeating comments made under previously mentioned legislation.

277. Where fire walls and fire-resisting structures provide containment for leaks of dangerous substance and/or prevent any escaping vapours from reaching an ignition source while still flammable, such barriers should not be perforated by any the dangerous substance in the form and quantity that might foreseeably occur in the event of an accident.

There is not a wall that can be classified as a fire wall.

367. Some repeated activities such as refuelling cars, or loading and unloading tankers intended for use on the public roads, involve the introduction of potential sources of ignition into an area where a spill is possible, which would meet the description of a hazardous area.

394. The purpose of verifying overall explosion safety is to confirm the workplace can operate in accordance with these Regulations. The workplace should not be brought into use if verification shows that explosion risks are such that it is not safe to do so. Verification should include consideration of the following:

(a) the dangerous substances that will be present at the workplace, including their hazardous properties and quantity;

(b) the suitability of the plant, equipment and protective systems for work in explosive atmospheres;

(d) the effectiveness of measures to:

• prevent explosive atmospheres forming;

• control risks from explosive atmospheres;

• mitigate the effects of an explosion;

(e) the effectiveness of emergency arrangements, where these are required.

The lack of ventilation means that the site is potentially dangerous and should not have been brought into use as an LPG store or Autogas refuelling station.

430. Steps to mitigate the effects of an incident may, where it is safe to do so, include:

(d) preventing the further spread of a spilled or leaking dangerous substance by the use of barriers, booms or absorbent materials;

(None evident on site)

(e) limiting the extent of any flammable vapour cloud arising from a release of the dangerous substance by, for example, the use of water sprays and curtains, or applying fire fighting foam over the surface of the spill or leaking liquid materials;

(None evident on site)

(f) increasing natural or mechanical ventilation to dilute hazardous concentrations of dangerous substances arising from an incident;

(Extremely poor ventilation)

(h) protecting the vessels or plant containing the dangerous substance against the effects of fire by such means as water deluge systems, water monitors and passive fire protection coatings;

(None evident on site)

SUMMARY

The DSEAR and other cited legislation are concerned with the prevention of risks from fire explosion and similar events arising from dangerous substances used or present in the workplace. They set minimum requirements for protection of workers on site, visiting public, and nearby at risk properties from fire and explosion risks. Safety standards will be maintained through the combination of the requirements of the DSEAR and Approved Codes of Practice (ACOPs). These are minimum standards and the Capital Gas site falls far short of the required safety standard.

It is difficult to quantify the source strength of the potential vapour cloud explosion in a realistic situation. The explosion will not be a daisy cutter, where everything is razed to the ground, but with a 3tonne LPG explosion little of the immediate buildings will be fit for reuse, not merely from the pressure blast which will penetrate buildings and allow ingress of the runaway exothermic cloud and burning material, but from radiation burns and asphyxiation from oxygen depletion. Included in this scenario must be the row of new dwellings opposite the site which will be less robust having been constructed from modern sheet materials that will contribute a mass of burning material.

Given this potential scenario, the assessment of the site for LPG storage and Autogas station, I am of the opinion that pre approval checks were carried out in a very cavalier or incompetent manner. There is an assumed Compliance with the codes of practice but if granted recklessly this may not in itself be sufficient to ensure that consent obtained under hazardous planning legislation, would remove significant risk. Even slight or low levels of risk are considered significant, when considering a highly flammable substance and this combined with a lack of ventilation the fuel filling area becomes Zone 1 from which any apparatus capable of producing a spark from static electricity or a mechanically produced spark i.e. any motor vehicle should be excluded.

On this site, with such a large area of walling, measurements should have been taken on the original inspection rather than relying on what must have been a cursory glance.

The site fails under HSG guidance section 394 and Regulation 6 alone:-

The purpose of verifying overall explosion safety is to confirm the workplace can operate in accordance with these regulations. The workplace should not be brought into use if verification shows that explosion risks are such that it is not safe to do so.

THE FOLLOWING ARE FAILINGS ON SITE

· Severe lack of ventilation - to prevent explosive atmospheres forming

· fire walls - to contain runaway exothermic explosions

· existing walling on site will promote the spread of explosive pressure effects through openings

· separation distances - to reduce the possibility of fire spread

· measures to contain spills - to reduce the possibility of fire spread

· lack of onsite surveillance - to prevent trespass and tampering

· inadequate fencing to public access - to prevent public access and tampering

· water sprays and curtains - to prevent vapour cloud spread

· zoning - prevention of vehicles entering what has become TOTALLY a Zone 1 area

· vulnerable population - danger of property destruction or death to people in adjacent office and nearby residential accommodation when a pressure blast carrying burning materials

· connecting workplace areas - there is a connecting door between Capital Gas Centre Ltd and Capital Roofing Centre Ltd encouraging explosive pressure and flame spread

· bulk tanks - supported by untested bunded mound with surface cavity

Planning permission

At the time of the original application there does not appear to be any input on this matter from HSE, presumably they were not asked to comment on the proposals. The Planning Department of Stoke on Trent City Council would have been aware that an existing hazard is situated directly adjacent to this site. Consideration should have been made to an additional hazard being formed and the combination creating a major hazard accordingly despite the client’s concerns voiced at the time.

The client also furnished the following information.

The applicant’s agent at the time of the original application included in their comments, the following:

“The applicant is aware of the requirements of safety and the relevant codes of practice have been ‘molded’ into the sites requirements”

This is completely out of order as the site has to meet the relevant regulations and Codes of Practice not the other way round

That at a meeting in the Council Chambers regarding the application for this permission, the case officer assigned to guide the proceedings was asked if the site met the relevant safety requirements he made the following recorded statement.

“I know the applicant and I trust their judgement”

I find this statement quite remarkable.

If this matter was at the proposal stage I would have to recommend refusal, based on the council’s duty to protect the public and employees. However as permission has been granted, it is within the council’s power to act responsibly and revoke the decision to permit dangerous activity at this site.

CONCLUSION

As I understand it, planning approval was given in early 2007, therefore I have considered the relevant regulations and Codes of Practice for that period, and it would appear there is no material difference between then and now.

Whether we take the situation as it is, or consider the suitability of the site as if it were ‘green field’, it is quite apparent that the site is wholly unsuitable; the main problem is that of ventilation, it does not meet Code of Practice 7 and misses the criterion severely. I cannot see how this dangerous condition can be remedied.

With regard to other safety matters such as access by third parties etc this would require considerable strengthening of security as well as revised methods to bund and direct the flow of spilled gas from the bulk tanks. Serious consideration would have to be given to the continued use of the cylinder storage area. I would recommend that use should cease immediately. There is immediate danger to the general public and to employees of the site operator.

E J Powell

c/o CBS

PO Box 501

Cheadle

ST10 5BE

Adendum

1. 22 January 2014

It is been observed that a large rubbish skip, which was removed for the convenience of a recent HSE inspection has now been returned to the site.

2. 10 February 2014

It has been observed that combustible material in the form of building plastics are being stored next to the client building, and within the lpg gas storage area. This is obscured from view by the gas cylinders stored in this compound. This situation will need further investigation and will be included in an amended report. HSE tests show that plastic forms a far greater fire risk than wood. This needs to be remedied without delay.

3. June 2014

An area of elevated land which forms a pocket for gas to accumulate has been back filled with broken tiles. This makes matters much worse as the broken tiles form thousands of pockets to trap gas.